ZION is not a single DAO. It is a federation of DAOs — one per layer, all connected.
Scope: L1 (Core) through L6 (Issobella) — every layer has its own Co-Admin governance Status: 🟡 Active development Last modified: 2026-05-21
1. Philosophy: The Federation of Layers
Traditional blockchain governance treats the protocol as a monolith — one token, one vote, one treasury. ZION recognizes that each layer has different risks, different stakeholders, and different time horizons.
| Layer | What it governs | Risk profile | Decision speed |
|---|---|---|---|
| L1 (Core) | Consensus rules, block rewards, issuance | Existential — bugs destroy everything | Slow (14+ days) |
| L2 (DAO) | Treasury spend, grants, bridge parameters | Financial — funds can be stolen | Medium (7 days) |
| L3 (WARP) | Cross-chain bridges, fee rates, validator sets | Interoperability — bridges are honeypots | Fast (3 days for emergency) |
| L4 (OASIS) | Avatar standards, quest design, reputation rules | Cultural — bad design kills adoption | Medium (7 days) |
| L5 (Terra Nova) | Land use, community admission, Bodhisattva vows | Human — mistakes harm real people | Very slow (consent-based, no time limit) |
| L6 (Issobella) | Space fund allocation, launch contracts, research IP | Visionary — mistakes waste decades | Very slow (30+ days) |
The Co-Admin principle: No single person or address controls any layer. Every critical action requires multiple independent Co-Admins — not just multisig signers, but governance participants with distinct roles, incentives, and accountability.
„Jeden klíč otevírá dveře. Dva klíče otevírají dveře s kontrolou. Sedm klíčů otevírá dveře tak, že nikdo nikdy neotevře sám — a to je svoboda."
2. The Co-Admin Architecture
2.1 Definition
A Co-Admin is a governance participant who:
- Holds keys to a multisig or voting power in a DAO
- Has skin in the game — staked tokens, reputation, or bonded collateral
- Is accountable — can be slashed, removed, or replaced through governance
- Represents a distinct interest — not a puppet of another Co-Admin
2.2 Co-Admin Tiers by Layer
| Layer | Co-Admin Role | Count | Selection | Removal | Key Tool |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| L1 | Validator Operator | 7+ | Stake-weighted election | Unbonding + slashing | Validator set contract |
| L1 | Core Developer | 5 | DAO proposal + reputation | DAO vote | Git commit access |
| L2 | Treasury Guardian | 7 | DAO election (token-weighted) | DAO vote + 14d timelock | 5-of-7 multisig |
| L2 | Bridge Guardian | 5 | Stake + bridge uptime | Emergency DAO + 7d review | 3-of-5 multisig |
| L3 | WARP Relayer | 5+ | Bonded stake + performance | Automatic (downtime) | Rotating leader election |
| L3 | Cross-Chain Auditor | 3 | DAO appointment | DAO vote | Manual review gate |
| L4 | OASIS Curator | 5 | Reputation + quest completion | Community vote | Quest approval rights |
| L4 | Avatar Moderator | 7 | Democratic election (1 avatar = 1 vote) | Recall election | Content moderation DAO |
| L5 | Community Guardian | 5–7 | Consciousness Verification + Bodhisattva Vow | Sociocratic consent + DAO burn | Physical circle + on-chain vote |
| L5 | L5 Network Delegate | 1 per community | Community circle election | Community recall | Network Council vote |
| L6 | Issobella Steward | 3 | L6-specific consciousness verification | 30-day DAO vote + scientific peer review | 2-of-3 multisig + academic board |
2.3 The Overlap Matrix
No Co-Admin should hold power in more than 2 adjacent layers to prevent concentration:
| Role | L1 | L2 | L3 | L4 | L5 | L6 | Max Layers |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core Dev | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | 2 |
| Treasury Guardian | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | 2 |
| Bridge Guardian | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | 2 |
| OASIS Curator | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ | 2 |
| Community Guardian | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | ❌ | 1* |
| Issobella Steward | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ❌ | ✅ | 1 |
*Community Guardians may serve in multiple L5 communities but not in L1–L4 or L6.
3. Layer-by-Layer Governance Detail
3.1 L1 — Core Protocol Governance
What is governed:
- Block reward schedule (89/5/5/1 split)
- Consensus algorithm changes (PoW → future upgrades)
- Hard fork coordination
- Genesis premine allocation (4B ZION)
Co-Admins:
| Role | Count | Power | Selection |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validator Operators | 7+ | Run nodes, validate blocks, earn rewards | Stake-weighted (min 100K ZION) |
| Core Developers | 5 | Propose code changes, review PRs | DAO-appointed + reputation |
| Security Council | 3 | Emergency pause, critical bug response | DAO election, 1-year term |
Voting:
- Standard changes: 14-day token-weighted vote, 10% quorum, 51% majority
- Emergency pause: 3-of-5 Security Council + 48h DAO ratification
- Hard fork: 21-day vote, 20% quorum, 66% supermajority + validator signaling
On-chain integration:
- Proposals encoded in L1 memo format:
DAO:parameter:<name>:<value> - Voting via balance snapshot at proposal block
- Execution via timelock contract (48h minimum)
Existing implementation: See V3/L2/dao/src/proposal.rs, V3/L2/dao/src/voting.rs, V3/L2/dao/src/executor.rs
3.2 L2 — DAO Treasury & Bridge Governance
What is governed:
- Treasury spend (1.5B ZION DAO premine, sloty 7–8 + ongoing revenue)
- Bridge parameters (fees, validator thresholds, supported chains)
- Grant allocation (humanitarian, development, research)
- Emergency actions (pause, rotate guardians)
Co-Admins:
| Role | Count | Threshold | Key Power |
|---|---|---|---|
| Treasury Guardians | 7 | 5-of-7 | Spend treasury, execute grants |
| Bridge Guardians | 5 | 3-of-5 | Rotate bridge validators, pause/unpause |
| DAO Voters | Unlimited | Token-weighted | Propose, vote, delegate |
Proposal types (from code):
| Type | Quorum | Period | Example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Parameter | 10% | 7 days | Change fee rate, quorum threshold |
| Treasury | 15% | 7 days | Spend 1M ZION on development |
| Emergency | 20% | 3 days | Pause bridge, freeze treasury |
| Grant | 10% | 7 days | Fund L5 community build |
| Humanitarian | 10% | 7 days | Allocate to climate resilience |
Revenue model:
Block Reward (L1)
├── 89% → Miners (PPLNS)
├── 5% → Humanitarian Tithe (L2 DAO-controlled)
├── 5% → Issobella Fund (L6 DAO-controlled, locked)
└── 1% → Pool operator fee
Bridge Fees (L2 WARP)
├── 50% → Relayers
├── 25% → L2 DAO treasury
└── 25% → L1 buyback/burn
Existing implementation: See V3/L2/dao/src/treasury.rs, V3/L2/dao/src/proposal.rs
3.3 L3 — WARP Cross-Chain Governance
What is governed:
- Supported chains (EVM, Bitcoin, future)
- Fee rates per chain
- Relayer validator sets
- Slashing conditions for misbehaving relayers
Co-Admins:
| Role | Count | Selection | Removal |
|---|---|---|---|
| WARP Relayers | 5+ | Bonded stake (min 500K ZION) | Automatic slashing (downtime, fraud proof) |
| Cross-Chain Auditors | 3 | DAO appointment | DAO vote |
| Chain Curators | 1 per chain | Reputation + uptime | Community petition |
Voting:
- Standard: Rotating leader election (PBFT-style consensus among relayers)
- Chain addition: L2 DAO proposal (15% quorum, 7 days) + L3 relayer consent (3-of-5)
- Emergency: 2-of-3 Cross-Chain Auditors can pause any bridge, 48h L2 DAO ratification
Unique feature: Fraud proofs. Any relayer can challenge another. If challenged relayer cannot produce valid proof within 24h, they are slashed automatically. No DAO vote needed — this is algorithmic governance.
3.4 L4 — OASIS Digital Realm Governance
What is governed:
- Avatar standards (visual, behavioral, lore consistency)
- Quest design rules (reward rates, difficulty curves)
- Reputation algorithm parameters
- Content moderation (spam, abuse, off-brand behavior)
Co-Admins:
| Role | Count | Selection | Removal |
|---|---|---|---|
| OASIS Curators | 5 | Reputation score (min 5,000) + quest completion | Community vote (1 avatar = 1 vote) |
| Avatar Moderators | 7 | Democratic election within active avatar holders | Recall election (20% quorum) |
| Quest Designers | Open | Application + curator approval | Curator vote |
Voting:
- Quest approval: 3-of-5 Curator consent
- Reputation parameter change: 7-day avatar-holder vote, 10% quorum
- Moderation action: 2-of-3 Moderator consensus (fast — spam cannot wait)
Unique feature: 1 avatar = 1 vote (not token-weighted). OASIS is a cultural space, not a financial one. Wealth should not determine voice here.
3.5 L5 — Terra Nova Physical Community Governance
What is governed:
- Land use and expansion
- Community admission (Consciousness Verification, Bodhisattva Vow)
- Local treasury (10% of node rewards + guest revenue)
- Inter-node protocols (seed library, Medical Table, mesh standards)
Co-Admins:
| Role | Count | Threshold | Selection |
|---|---|---|---|
| Community Guardians | 5–7 | Sociocratic consent (off-chain) + DAO ratification (on-chain) | Consciousness Verification + Bodhisattva Vow |
| L5 Network Delegates | 1 per community | 2/3 of represented communities | Community circle election |
| Finance Guardians | 2 per community | 2-of-3 multisig (local ops wallet) | Guardian internal rotation |
Voting:
- Local decisions (< 500 EUR): Operations Circle consent (off-chain)
- Local decisions (500–5,000 EUR): Finance Circle → General Circle consent + 48h DAO record
- Local decisions (> 5,000 EUR): General Circle consent → 7-day on-chain DAO vote (60% quorum)
- New Guardian admission: 4-Gate Consciousness Verification + 72h DAO review (see
consciousness-admission-framework.md) - Bodhisattva Vow: Physical ceremony + 7-day distributed witnessing DAO vote (see §6.4)
- Expulsion: Investigation + 7-day quadratic consent vote at 75% threshold (see §8)
Existing implementation: See V3/L5/docs/GOVERNANCE/community-dao-framework.md, V3/L5/docs/GOVERNANCE/consciousness-admission-framework.md
3.6 L6 — Issobella Space Governance
What is governed:
- Allocation of 5% block reward (Issobella Fund)
- Research grants (space agriculture, closed-loop life support, propulsion)
- Launch contracts and partnerships
- Intellectual property from funded research
Co-Admins:
| Role | Count | Threshold | Selection |
|---|---|---|---|
| Issobella Stewards | 3 | 2-of-3 multisig + academic board review | L6-specific Consciousness Verification + scientific peer review |
| Scientific Advisory Board | 7 | Advisory (no binding vote) | Invitation by Stewards + DAO confirmation |
| L6 DAO Voters | All ZION holders | Token-weighted (same as L2) | Automatic (holding ZION) |
Voting:
- Research grant: Steward proposal → 30-day DAO vote (10% quorum, 51% majority) + scientific board review (non-binding but public)
- Launch contract: Steward proposal → 45-day DAO vote (15% quorum, 66% supermajority) — because launch contracts are irreversible
- IP release: 2-of-3 Steward + scientific board unanimous consent (knowledge should be free, but timing matters)
Lock-up: Issobella funds are time-locked — cannot be spent before 2030 (unless emergency, which requires 4-of-5 L2 Treasury Guardian + L6 Steward unanimous). This prevents premature allocation.
4. Cross-Layer DAO Voting Flows
4.1 The Standard Proposal Lifecycle (All Layers)
┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐ ┌─────────────┐
│ DRAFT │ → │ REVIEW │ → │ VOTE │ → │ TIMELOCK │ → │ EXECUTE │
└─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘ └─────────────┘
│ │ │ │ │
Proposer Co-Admin Token or 48h minimum Multisig
writes review (off- consent (L1/L2/L3) or algorithm
proposal chain or on- voting 7d (L4/L5) (L3 fraud
chain) (layer-specific) 30d (L6) proofs)
4.2 Cross-Layer Proposals
Some decisions affect multiple layers. These require sequential or parallel voting:
| Decision | Layers Affected | Process |
|---|---|---|
| Add new bridge chain | L2 + L3 | L2 DAO proposal (15% quorum, 7d) → if passed, L3 relayer consent (3-of-5) |
| Change block reward split | L1 + L2 + L6 | L1 token vote (20% quorum, 14d) + L2 DAO ratification (10% quorum, 7d) + L6 Steward advisory |
| Fund L5 community | L2 + L5 | L2 DAO grant proposal (10% quorum, 7d) → L5 community circle consent (off-chain) → funds released via milestone |
| OASIS quest rewards L1 block | L1 + L4 | L4 avatar-holder vote (10% quorum, 7d) → L2 DAO treasury proposal (15% quorum, 7d) → L1 parameter change |
| Emergency hard fork | L1 + L2 + L3 | L1 Security Council (3-of-5) → immediate action → 48h L2 DAO ratification → 7d L3 relayer consent |
4.3 The Veto Chain
Any layer can veto a cross-layer proposal that directly affects it:
L2 proposes: "Allocate 10M ZION to L5 Te Pīko Ora"
├── L2 DAO vote: PASSED (15% quorum, 51% yes)
├── L5 Network Council review: CONSENT (2/3 communities agree)
├── Te Pīko Ora circle: CONSENT (no reasoned objection)
└── ✅ EXECUTED
L2 proposes: "Reduce L5 node reward share from 10% to 5%"
├── L2 DAO vote: PASSED (15% quorum, 51% yes)
├── L5 Network Council review: OBJECTION (2/3 communities object)
└── ❌ VETOED — requires separate negotiation
Veto override: If a proposal is vetoed by an affected layer, it can only pass with:
- L1/L2: 66% supermajority + 30-day extended voting
- L3/L4/L5/L6: Unanimous consent of all remaining layers + mediation by ZION Foundation
5. Co-Admin Accountability & Slashing
5.1 Slashing Conditions by Layer
| Layer | Offense | Slashing | Executor |
|---|---|---|---|
| L1 | Validator downtime > 7 days | Stake slashed (portion) | Algorithmic |
| L1 | Double-sign / equivocation | Full stake slashed | Algorithmic |
| L2 | Unauthorized treasury spend | Reputation reset, removal from multisig | DAO vote |
| L2 | Bridge Guardian fraud | Bond slashed, permanent ban | Algorithmic + DAO |
| L3 | Relayer downtime > 24h | Bond slashed (proportional) | Algorithmic |
| L3 | Fraud proof validated | Full bond slashed | Algorithmic |
| L4 | Content abuse (moderator) | Removal, reputation burn | Avatar-holder vote |
| L5 | Bodhisattva vow breach (serious) | Token burned, network ban | Quadratic consent (75%) |
| L6 | Misallocation of research funds | Steward removal, academic censure | 30-day DAO + peer review |
5.2 The Grace Period
No Co-Admin is slashed without due process:
- Accusation — written, signed, on-chain
- Investigation — independent Co-Admin from another layer (to prevent collusion)
- Defense — accused has right to respond
- Review — minimum 7 days (L1/L2/L3) or 14 days (L4/L5/L6)
- Execution — only after all steps complete
„Spravedlnost není rychlost. Spravedlnost je důkladnost."
6. The Co-Admin Onboarding Path
How does someone become a Co-Admin? Each layer has a progressive path:
New Participant
├── L1: Stake ZION → Run validator → Earn reputation → Propose protocol changes
├── L2: Hold ZION → Vote in DAO → Submit proposals → Elected as Guardian
├── L3: Bond ZION → Run relayer → Maintain uptime → Earn relayer rewards
├── L4: Create avatar → Complete quests → Earn reputation → Elected as Curator
├── L5: Visit community → Consciousness Verification → Bodhisattva Vow → Guardian
└── L6: Scientific contribution → Peer review → Steward nomination → DAO confirmation
Cross-layer progression:
- A successful L5 Guardian may be nominated for L2 Treasury Guardian (but cannot hold both simultaneously)
- A L3 Relayer with 99.9% uptime may be fast-tracked to L2 Bridge Guardian
- An L4 Curator with 10,000+ reputation may advise L5 community culture design (but has no binding power)
7. Technical Implementation
7.1 L2 DAO Contract Schema (Pseudocode)
// ZION L2 DAO — Multi-Layer Governance Contract
contract ZionDAO {
// ── Co-Admin Registry ───────────────────────────────
mapping(address => CoAdmin) public coAdmins;
mapping(uint8 => address[]) public layerCoAdmins; // layerId => addresses
struct CoAdmin {
uint8 layer; // 1-6
uint8 role; // 0=Validator, 1=Guardian, 2=Relayer, ...
uint256 reputation;
uint256 bonded; // staked/bonded amount
bool isActive;
uint256 appointedAt;
uint256 termEnd; // 0 = indefinite
}
// ── Proposal Lifecycle ──────────────────────────────
struct Proposal {
uint256 id;
uint8 layer; // which layer governs this
uint8 proposalType; // 0=Parameter, 1=Treasury, 2=Emergency, 3=Grant, ...
address proposer;
bytes32 descriptionHash;
uint256 snapshotBlock;
uint256 votesFor;
uint256 votesAgainst;
uint256 votesAbstain;
uint256 votingEndsAt;
uint256 timelockEndsAt;
ProposalStatus status;
}
// ── Cross-Layer Veto ───────────────────────────────
mapping(uint256 => mapping(uint8 => bool)) public layerVeto; // proposalId => layer => vetoed
mapping(uint256 => uint8) public requiredLayers; // proposalId => bitmask of layers that must consent
// ── Functions ──────────────────────────────────────
function propose(uint8 layer, bytes32 descHash, uint8 pType) external returns (uint256);
function vote(uint256 proposalId, uint8 choice, uint256 weight) external;
function execute(uint256 proposalId) external;
function veto(uint256 proposalId) external; // only callable by affected layer's Co-Admins
function slash(address target, uint8 reason) external; // governance-controlled
}
7.2 L2 DAO Config Integration
The existing DaoConfig is extended with:
// In V3/L2/dao/src/config.rs
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct DaoConfig {
// ... existing fields ...
// ── Multi-Layer Co-Admin ────────────────────────────
/// Co-Admins by layer
pub co_admins: HashMap<u8, Vec<CoAdminConfig>>,
/// Cross-layer veto enabled (default: true)
pub cross_layer_veto_enabled: bool,
/// Minimum layers that must consent for cross-layer proposals
pub cross_layer_consent_threshold: u8,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct CoAdminConfig {
pub layer: u8, // 1-6
pub role: String, // "validator", "guardian", "relayer", "curator", "community", "steward"
pub address: String,
pub public_key: String,
pub bonded_amount: u64,
pub reputation: u64,
pub term_start: String, // ISO 8601
pub term_end: Option<String>,
pub is_active: bool,
}
7.3 API Endpoints
New endpoints added to V3/L2/dao/src/api.rs:
| Method | Path | Description | Auth |
|---|---|---|---|
| GET | /api/dao/co-admins |
List all Co-Admins across layers | Public |
| GET | /api/dao/co-admins/:layer |
List Co-Admins for specific layer | Public |
| POST | /api/dao/co-admins |
Add/rotate Co-Admin (layer governance) | X-DAO-Key + layer multisig |
| GET | /api/dao/cross-layer/:proposalId |
Get cross-layer consent status | Public |
| POST | /api/dao/cross-layer/veto |
Veto cross-layer proposal | Layer Co-Admin key |
| GET | /api/dao/slashing |
List active slashing proposals | Public |
| POST | /api/dao/slashing |
Propose slashing | X-DAO-Key |
8. Emergency Governance
8.1 The Escalation Ladder
When things go wrong, governance speeds up but requires more Co-Admins:
| Severity | Layers | Response Time | Co-Admins Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Green — Minor bug | L1 only | 14 days | Standard vote |
| Yellow — Bridge anomaly | L2 + L3 | 7 days | Bridge Guardian (3-of-5) + DAO review |
| Orange — Treasury breach | L2 only | 48 hours | Security Council (3-of-5) + freeze |
| Red — Consensus failure | L1 + L2 + L3 | 24 hours | Security Council (3-of-5) + Emergency DAO (20% quorum, 3 days) |
| Black — Catastrophic | All layers | Immediate | Algorithmic pause (L1) + 2-of-3 per layer multisig |
8.2 Algorithmic Governance (L1 & L3)
Some emergencies cannot wait for human votes:
- L1 double-sign: Automatic slashing within 1 block
- L3 fraud proof: Automatic relayer slashing within 24h challenge window
- L2 daily spend limit exceeded: Automatic treasury freeze until Guardian override
- L1 validator downtime > 7 days: Automatic exclusion from validator set
These are not democratic. They are mechanistic — code is law when speed is existential.
9. Open Questions
- Co-Admin term limits: should L2 Guardians serve fixed terms (e.g., 2 years) or indefinite?
- Layer overlap: how strictly should the "max 2 adjacent layers" rule be enforced? On-chain or social?
- Cross-layer veto: should veto require reason, or can layers veto without explanation?
- L6 lock-up: should Issobella funds be locked until 2030, or gradually unlocked?
- L4 avatar voting: how to prevent Sybil attacks (multiple avatars per person)?
- L5 network council: how to handle conflicts between communities (e.g., Genesis Garden vs. Dharma Temple veto)?
- Emergency black: who holds the "algorithmic pause" keys for L1? Security Council or distributed threshold?
- Co-Admin compensation: should Guardians be paid, or is this volunteer-only? If paid, from which treasury?
- Delegation: should token holders be able to delegate voting power? If so, to whom?
„Governance není o rozhodování. Je o navrhování systémů, ve kterých se dobrá rozhodnutí dějí sama — a špatná rozhodnutí se dají opravit, než způsobí škodu."
Multi-Layer DAO Governance · Terra Nova L5 Governance · ZION Protocol · 2026